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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 940641-CA 
v. : 
KELLY JAMES PICCIRILLO, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for distribution of 
a controlled substance (methamphetamine), an enhanced first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-
8(1) (a) (ii) and 58-37-8 (1) (b) (i) (1994); possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine), an enhanced first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) and 
58-37-8(1) (b) (i) (1994); and possession of drug paraphernalia, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) 
(1994) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly admit a certified copy of 
defendant's prior drug related felony conviction during the guilt 
phase of trial? 
The trial court has "a good deal of discretion" to 
admit evidence under rule 404(b), Utah Rule's of Evidence. State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994) (,f[o]ther rulings on the 
admission of evidence entail a good deal of discretion") (dicta). 
See State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah 1983); United States 
v. Patterson, 20 F.3d 809, 813 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 115 
S.Ct. 128 (1994). See also State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 
1290 (Utah App. 1994) ("A trial court's decision regarding 
admissibility of evidence is generally accorded 'a good deal of 
discretion' by an appellate court." (quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 
938)). But cJU State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 698-99 (Utah App. 
1993) (holding the trial court's 404(b) determination constitutes 
a legal question reviewed for correctness), cert, denied, 859 
P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). The appellate courts accord trial courts 
considerable freedom to admit or exclude evidence under rule 403, 
Utah Rule's of Evidence. Pena, 689 P.2d at 937-38 (dicta). See 
also State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992) 
(reviewing trial court's rule 403 ruling for "reasonability"). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b): 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession and distribution 
of methamphetamine, both enhanced to first degree felonies under 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8 (1) (a) and 58-37-8 (1) (b) (i) (1994); and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1994) (R. 43-44). 
Following a jury trial held May 19, 1994, defendant was 
convicted as charged (R. 71-72). 
The trial court imposed two five to 15 year terms in 
the Utah State Prison for the first degree felonies and a six 
month jail term for the third degree felony, all terms to run 
concurrently (R. 99-101) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In February 1994, Garrick Hafen, a then confidential 
informant working with Washington County law enforcement, 
arranged to make a controlled buy of methamphetamine from 
defendant (R. 204-07, 331-32, 334). Hafen called defendant's St. 
George motel room from the Hurricane Police Department, on 
February 7, 1994, to find out when defendant would have 
methamphetamine available for sale (R. 207, 332-33).2 A few 
days later, on February 10, 1994, Hafen met with police at the 
St. George Police Department to set up a controlled buy with 
defendant for that afternoon (R. 211, 334). 
1
 The telephone conversation was recorded and admitted at 
trial (R. 347, Exh. #1). 
3 
Prior to the controlled buy, Hafen, his wife (who 
accompanied him on the buy), and their car were searched (R. 212, 
220, 251, 338). Hafen was then equipped with a body wire or 
listening device and provided one $20 bill and one $10 bill (both 
of which had been previously photocopied) to make the buy (R. 
216, 335-37; Exh. #9). 
Police maintained both visual and audio contact with 
the Hafens as they drove from the police department to 
defendant's motel where they arrived at approximately 4:30 p.m. 
(R. 211, 221). Once the Hafens were admitted into defendant's 
motel room, police overheard defendant sell Hafen one half gram 
of methamphetamine (R. 223). 
Specifically, Hafen asked defendant if he had any 
methamphetamine (R. 223, 339). Defendant indicated that he did, 
and Hafen asked for a "quarter" (one-fourth gram) (R. 223). 
Defendant stated that he only had "half bindles made up" (one-
half gram) (R. 223, 339), and also commented that he was 
"paranoid" having the methamphetamine around (R. 223). Because 
Hafen had only $30.00 with him, defendant agreed to let Hafen 
take a half bindle of methamphetamine on Hafen's promise to come 
back later that afternoon with more money (R. 223, 345; Exh. 
#10) .2 
Immediately following the controlled buy, police met 
with Hafen at a pre-arranged location approximately two and one 
2
 The conversation between defendant and Hafen was 
recorded and admitted at trial (R. 342-43; Exh. #4). 
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and Hafen's vehicle were again searched an.: r.afer. turned over the 
-^  —•.- V- -2 ^ -c -r >- 3 ^- ^ •*- m<=: - V) ^ n r p h p t- ^rr ] p f-
* v ; ' r 
post-buy searcr: -r . Police tnen "debriefec" Haf en L-J 
verify w u ^ t"^ h~ ; ov^rh^rd confirming "hat Kafer. had entered 
def enda.. 
methamphetamine fir. defendant, who was th- only person occupying 
t j i e r O Q m w j i e n t j i e Hafens arrive -ased — "his 
information, police sought and „__ -.-__.. -..:: . i _>r 
defendant's motel room, which they execute-; one hour after the 
) . 
Just prior to the execution of .- search warrant and 
after the Kafen.- na * .ef", police observeo . . *• female "*ater 
room i c ^ icma^ ixcc; *>.
 ; - . hor*- w.A^w, ieav„;;r before 
the officers approached :c execute * rit; sea ::• warran: 
Upon executing the search warrant, police immediately 
observed methamphetamine -;-cifieal:y# 
approximately .1 •* ^ .•--;iaii J^L«I1. ..mdiet : uceLhamphetamine ^nd 
razor bla *;r.r: a on a ciedenza . - - The S2 bill 
television r r •• '.daiLi< acn paraphernalia 
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open and obvious view was also seized, including a pen pipe with 
a glass bowl and a propane burner (R. 23 6, 3 04; Exh. #16). 
Defendant, who was alone in the room at the time, was 
hand-cuffed and provided Miranda3 warnings (R. 235, 299) . 
Defendant told Officer Seegmiller he had been staying in the room 
for approximately one week (R. 236). When Officer Seegmiller 
asked defendant (who was on probation from a prior drug-related 
conviction) "if he would be dirty if he was given a urine test" 
(R. 239). With his head down, defendant said, "Yeah" (R. 239). 
Approximately 15 minutes into the search, Freda 
returned to the motel room (R. 242, 303-04), and, upon 
discovering the officers, stated that she had left to sell drugs 
and to buy groceries with a $10 bill defendant had just given 
her. Id. 
At trial, Freda testified on defendant's behalf, 
claiming that the motel room was hers, that defendant was just 
visiting, and that he did not know that she had agreed to supply 
methamphetamine for Hafen (R. 355, 358-59). 
Defendant similarly testified that he was unaware his 
mother had the methamphetamine in the 12' by 6' motel room (R. 
369, 374). While defendant admitted that he had sold to Hafen in 
the past, and that he met with Hafen on February 10, 1994, he 
denied making a drug transaction at that time (R. 369). Rather, 
defendant claimed that the taped conversation introduced into 
evidence had in fact occurred one year prior (R. 373), and that 
3
 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Hafen had given hin. ! :>? ?2~ bill en February 1 0, 1 9:34, i n 
repayment of a loan 
The trial court properly a:i;r;;tted a certified copy of 
•\ -F r a n ( 
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case, defenda r was not entitled tc a bifurcated proceeding 
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undei r^c£ -* &... : *.cr .:
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Consequently, there was ric necessity for a bifurcated proceeding 
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evidence unde^ >-.;.--: 4"^ .- . 4.4a : na ]y i;- ^use :ne State 
: • "" •^.v^.c *
 n 
ana distribut i ::;\ c: r::ethamphetam: nt- admission oi lie prior 
conviction does not undermine confidence m the outcome oi the 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED DEFENDANT'S 
PRIOR CONVICTION DURING THE GUILT PHASE OF 
TRIAL UNDER RULES 403 AND 404(b), UTAH RULES 
OF EVIDENCE; MOREOVER, ADMISSION OF THE 
EVIDENCE DOES NOT UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE IN THE 
JURY VERDICT 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1994) provides for the 
enhancement of drug related convictions when a defendant has 
previously been convicted for felony offense thereunder.4 
Accordingly, defendant was charged and convicted for enhanced 
first degree felony counts of drug distribution and possession, 
based on his prior conviction for a drug related felony. 
On appeal, defendant claims prejudicial error based on 
the trial court's denial of his motion to bifurcate the trial, 
which procedure would have precluded the jury's consideration of 
his previous conviction unless or until their determination of 
his guilt on the charged offenses. Br. of App. at 6-10. While a 
bifurcated proceeding would normally be required, defendant's 
argument overlooks the admissibility of his prior conviction 
during the guilt phase of trial as both relevant and probative of 
his knowledge intent and identity under Utah Rules of Evidence 
403 and 404(b). 
Section 58-37-8(1)(b)(i) provides: 
Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(1)(a) with respect to a substance classified 
in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction of Subsection (1)(a) is guilty of 
a first degree felony. 
8 
A. Proceedings Below 
During preliminary jury instructions and prior to the 
reading of the Amended Information,, defense counsel asked to 
attaches «o A.aenau nereanex, L + ^  , ^^^ v.,uii aLi.d ^ otn 
counsel conferred ctf the recorc see Addendum A. 
- . ..
 r,d 
if- -c secure « record ;n -* ?Decif;c ohiecticr; that hp wants 
first, recess v^ -:-. * release : ,.t „ .-* , - bee Aaaeiiaum A. 
The fria" c~u% * r :.- resumed its prel inna • * ir s^  v*;ct ions .he 
: - : • [ 1 
defendant s previous telony conviction ur;aer secia?n 58-3"' ^ R , 
43 « , l^ j. see Adner.dT*-
court ana counsel r nferred ..r, tne record, "utsiae the presence 
of Lh^ - -^ -^ ' '" "-"" -ddend" ~ ,^ 4 *--e-
inqui.- •_- _ - i 
limine t ::> hav the [court make :. :efereno- to 
[defendant ' r1 rri^r -
 r,r:^A^ - -~^ *,.-,-. ^kl counts J and II 
a s - - _ - — - s ^ ^ ddeiidiit i: i 1 \ 
Defense counsel responded with a request * -.* tne court: 
"bifurcate" the r~->ceedin J-UH xespeci iu a — evidence that 
might be present. - - *r as prior rnnv^^jions of 
[defendant] " 193-94 see Addendum •' Vefen.se counsel based 
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his request for a bifurcated proceeding on rule 4 03 arguing that 
otherwise relevant evidence should be excluded if its prejudicial 
effect outweighs its probative value (R. 194), see Addendum A. 
However, defense counsel further indicated his belief that 
defendant's prior drug related conviction was "an element of the 
offense [s]" charged and that it had "great probative value," but 
"that under [r]ule 403 and in order to afford [defendant] due 
process of law and a fair trial," the trial should be bifurcated 
(R. 194), see Addendum A. 
In ruling on defense counsel's request for a bifurcated 
proceeding, the trial court found that no prejudice resulted from 
the reading of the Amended Information to the jury, as "[t]hey 
have been repeatedly instructed that those are merely 
allegations" (R. 194), see Addendum A. However, the trial court 
delayed further ruling on the requested bifurcated procedure: 
With respect to the process of the trial, [] 
I am going to order that with the presenting 
of the evidence, that the very last thing 
that the State may put in before it rests --
and make no reference to it until such prior 
time -- is the prior conviction upon which 
the enhancement of both Count I and II are 
based. That will allow the Court the 
opportunity to specifically make the decision 
as to whether or not that evidence should 
come in, weighing all of the State's evidence 
in light of Rule 4 03 of the Rules of 
Evidence, prejudicial value versus probative 
effect, and Rule 404(b) of the Rules of 
Evidence, evidence admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or 
accident, until the case is -- the State's 
case in chief is shown to me in its entirety. 
Absent that matter, I will not have a 
satisfactory evidentiary basis in order to 
10 
in illiuct the we igh ing p r o c e s s I ha I t he R u l e s 
of Evidence r e q u i r e t h a t T i |ii lilt1" in b e f o r e 
admitting the evidence. 
C° i o ^ s e e Addendui i i A (ernphas^o aduuu) . 
Defendant .*- cross-examination ct r he Star, e s witnesses 
made cl ea r. 1 
and iiiteri' . suppc-t a conviciuri : „: ciiiicr possession c: 
distribution : controlled substances. Defense counsel asked 
: :; y t -.:. * ^nythi*iy about tn* methamj. iiei -i ..^ iit seized from, the 
motel roorr: :R <. 14 *,':?.• Officer Seegmi] ' er recalled defendant 
... .  " \ 
remembered other otiicers telling him that defendant denied 
knowledge ;'— ^ ••-•^ J ; 
:::f:::i cei: 3 ohnson, defense conn sel 
emphasized that L.V: "fficer had heard Hafe :.-:?.- i :;r defendant's 
mother, ar.d r.~- def°ndan" --* •'"•*• * *-~ -f -'*---* Tr^^olled bey (R. 
Johnson established that tne re or: vtax registered to defendant's 
T^h-^r ari *;;~:" no motel room key was found on defendant's 
Defense counsel's cross-examination of Gaxrick Hafen, 
established +;u-i- Ha^e:~ h^i : *• *—- *-*:r~hased cor"- "" -a 
substances ::.:. u_: ,~^- .. . ._. he na^t ^ 
Thus, the combined effect of defendant's cross-
examinations was to suggebL L U uie x y 
3 ] 
just the innocent, albeit ill-fated, son of a drug-dealing 
mother. 
At the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, the 
prosecutor requested to approach the bench and the trial court 
and counsel again conferred off the record (R. 352) (the 
pertinent transcript pages are attached as Addendum B). 
Immediately following this conference, the trial court noted that 
the prosecutor had offered a certified copy of the Judgment, 
Sentence and Commitment for defendant's previous drug related 
conviction (R. 352; Exh. #12)5, see Addendum B. Defense counsel 
renewed his objection to the evidence "on the same grounds that I 
put on the record at the time I made my Motion in Limine, a 
motion to bifurcate" (R. 353), see Addendum B. The trial court 
summarily overruled defendant's objection and admitted the 
evidence (R. 353), see Addendum B. 
B. Waiver on Appeal 
In his Summary of Argument defendant broadly asserts 
that the trial court erred in allowing his prior conviction "to 
be made known to the jury in the reading of the Amended 
Information and in allowing the introduction of defendant's prior 
conviction in the form of State's Exhibit 12." Br. of App. at 5. 
However, defendant's Argument focuses exclusively on the trial 
court's alleged erroneous admission of the prior conviction under 
rule 403. Br. of App. at 6-12. He has not further developed his 
5
 Defendant has not requested that any of the exhibits 
admitted at trial be made part of the record on appeal (R. 104). 
12 
clain t of error 'concerning the reading ui l.Jiu Amended information 
or otherwise provided the Court with any nieaningful analysis of 
"
u
^ issue I:~: ~- ** • extent the issue iy L;r~~- rent : - -
c-iw-aani s r;:^:. ,.s merely incidental ^ ^ic^dant ., 
complaint concernina the ultimate admissic: •;• pi.or crimes 
e v : ~t~: "- :• - ~ - . ' r t 
C O I l C B r n i L Q L u v ; e « C i - . n ^ t c r u a c i i G c a x i i i u i u i a L x ^ i j v. G iii: i r y 1 ? 
inadequate under the briefing i\„Le and should be rejected iy : r.r-
L L c C O n t e n ' ^i.^ ciIxU i c a S u h c *.-.*. .^iicr a p p c i ^ a , . W^L^* : c S p e C l LO L l i e 
issues presented - e State v. Price. 827 p.2d 24 , ^ 4S 
idi/uie tu pa,.>: T^mngful analysis and otherwise comply with 
the briefing rule-. 
1 <- * • . > -< . - : . s 
objection tc t:;e reading of tne Amendea in: ":rma:ic/ i\ r.r.e trial 
T^I^'* i« ^ •* *^ t" »=i *^  - ^ 'r _.  > *• h sui?ra Vv*'*"" * — i° f endar* *" *"*•"?' hav*^ 
,_-;- . . . . i -V, 
the court and parties conferred off the re: : • .:. defendant has 
-i-i /-v *- r,yTT'"i ^ 1°^ +- v- -
 t- "^  *- +• T . - - •*• f -s > r>/-rwH * , •£ *"->c "oarticular 
informatio: ,-tate v. Jones, 657 P : d ; .< * * • "tah i9^./' 
rurder r+" shoving err^r i c "^  * v - ra**y who seeks to upset 
. ^nce to the contrary, 
we assume regularity* * he proceedings i e a n :i affirm, the 
-"jicrmenL. y. xmaccv-i, uxic iccord demonstrate .3 on] } that dpfpnclant 
requested a bifurcated procedure under evidentiary rule 4 03 for 
purposes of introducing his prior conviction at trial (R. 193-
94), see Addendum A. The reading of the Amended Information to 
the jury however, does not raise an admissibility question under 
rule 403. Defendant's reliance on a rule of evidence is 
inadequate to preserve a possible objection to the reading of the 
Amended Information. The record is simply silent as to whether, 
and on what precise legal grounds defendant objected to the 
reading of the Amended Information in this case. State v. 
Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Utah 1989) (!IXA general rule of 
appellate review in criminal cases in Utah is that a 
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation 
of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record 
before an appellate court will review such claim on appeal.'") 
(quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987)). Thus, 
any issue concerning the propriety of the court's reading of the 
Amended Information to the jury is waived. Defendant has not 
asserted that there are unusual circumstances justifying his 
failure to preserve his objection below. State v. Archambeau, 
820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1992) . Consequently, the only issue 
properly before the Court concerns the admission of defendant's 
prior conviction during the guilt phase of trial.6 
6
 Even assuming that the Court determines the record and 
defendant's brief are adequate to preserve the issue, any error 
resulting from the reading of the Amended Information to the jury 
constitutes harmless error for the same reasons admission of the 
prior conviction at trial fails to undermine confidence in the 
outcome, discussed in Part E, infra. 
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C. Discretionary Standard of Review 
This Court has previously applied a bifurcated standard 
of review to the admissibility of other crimes evidence under 
rule 404(b). State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 698 (Utah App. 
1993). Specifically, the Court viewed the admission of the 
evidence as a legal question and applied a correctness standard. 
Id, However, the trial court's subsidiary factual findings were 
given deference and reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. 
Id. at 698-99. As support for this bifurcated approach to the 
admissibility of evidence, the Court relied upon what was then 
the Utah Supreme Court's most recent exegesis on appropriate 
standards of review, State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n. 11 
(Utah 1993). Because the supreme court has since clarified and 
refined its articulation of the standards for reviewing trial 
court rulings, State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), the 
bifurcated approach followed in O'Neil should be reconsidered. 
Indeed, the Court has since recognized Pena's deferential review 
of evidentiary rulings in State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 
(Utah App. 1994) (affirming trial court's refusal to allow 
impeachment of State's witness with prior convictions which did 
not meet criteria of rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence). 
In Pena, the supreme court clarified that "the universe 
of questions presented for review" includes more than just 
"mutually exclusive questions of fact or law." 869 P.2d at 936. 
Indeed, it also includes a "third category — the application of 
law to fact or, stated more fully, the determination of whether a 
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given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of 
law." Id. While theoretically, "the effect of a given set of 
facts is a question of law and, therefore one on which an 
appellate court owes no deference to a trial court's 
determination[,]" Pena clarifies that as a practical matter, 
application of a legal rule to a set of facts often "embodies a 
defacto grant of discretion which permits the trial court to 
reach one of several possible conclusions about the legal effect 
of a particular set of facts without risking reversal." Id. at 
937. Admissibility determinations fall into this third, 
application of law to fact, category. Id. at 938. 
As to the precise range of trial court discretion in 
applying law to a given set of facts, the supreme court described 
the standards of review as a spectrum "consisting of many shades 
of variance" where the "closeness of appellate review of the 
application of law to fact actually runs the entire length of 
this spectrum." 869 P.2d at 938. In so describing the standards, 
Pena expressly notes that determinations to admit or exclude 
evidence under rule 4 03 fall at the "broad end of the spectrum" 
where the appellate courts accord "considerable freedom in 
applying a legal principle to the facts, freedom to make 
decisions which appellate judges might not make themselves ab 
initio but will not reverse --in effect, creating the freedom to 
be wrong without incurring reversal." Id. at 937-38. See also 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P,2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992) (a trial 
court's rule 403 determination warrants reversal only if it 
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exceeds the limits of reasonability as a matter of law). 
Significantly, the supreme court further noted " [o]ther rulings 
on the admission of evidence also generally entail a good deal of 
discretion." Id. at 938. Although not specifically identified, 
rule 4 04(b) determinations presumably are included. See also 
State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah 1983) (a trial court has 
discretion to admit or exclude evidence under rule 4 04(b)). 
Accordingly, consistent with Pena, the Court should 
recognize the trial court's broad latitude in reviewing the 
admission of defendant's prior conviction under rule 404(b). 
D. Elemental Evidentiary Purpose for 
Admission of Prior Crimes Evidence Defeats 
Necessity for Bifurcated Proceeding 
Significantly, defendant did not dispute the relevance 
of his prior conviction under rule 404(b) in the trial court. He 
has done so only nominally on appeal. Br. of App. at 10. 
Rather, as noted previously, defendant argues primarily that he 
was entitled to a bifurcated proceeding below in order to 
facilitate the balancing requirements of rule 403. Id. 
Generally, a bifurcated procedure is required where, as 
here, the charged offense is capable of enhancement based on a 
jury's finding that the defendant has been previously convicted 
of a related offense. See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 492-98 
(Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result) (holding 
that plain language of aggravated sexual abuse statute 
contemplated a bifurcated procedure in which guilt of the 
underlying charge is determined prior to the jury's consideration 
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of prior crimes for enhancement purposes). See also State v. 
James, 767 P.2d 549, 557 (Utah 1989) (adopting bifurcated 
procedure advanced in Bishop and applying it to homicide 
statute). As recognized in Bishop, bifurcation is necessary in 
such a circumstance to avoid the improper "aggregation of issues 
and evidence" during the guilt phase of trial. Id. at 498. 
Where, however, there is an elemental evidentiary purpose, other 
than enhancement, for admission of prior crimes evidence, a 
bifurcated procedure is unnecessary. Indeed, the State is 
"entitled" to offer prior crimes evidence to establish disputed 
critical elements such as knowledge and intent under rule 404(b). 
O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 701. As set forth below, defendant's prior 
conviction was admissible during the guilt phase of trial for an 
evidentiary purpose unrelated to enhancement; thus, the trial 
court correctly denied his request for a bifurcated procedure. 
1. Rule 404(b) 
Although the trial court did not expressly state the 
basis for its ruling admitting defendant's prior conviction at 
the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, the reasonable 
inference from the record is that the conviction was properly 
admitted to establish defendant's disputed knowledge and intent 
and identity under rule 404(b).7 O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 701 
7
 Rule 404(b) provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
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(allowing admission of prior conviction to establish knowledge 
and intent to refute O'Neil's defense that he "'knew nothing'"). 
Indeed, as noted in part A, supra, the trial court initially 
reserved ruling on defendant's motion to bifurcate the trial in 
order to further consider the matter under the rule. And, as 
further noted in Part A, supra, defendant's cross-examinations of 
the State's witnesses put at issue his knowledge, intent and 
identity as the drug dealer. 
Rule 404(b) is recognized by this Court as an 
inclusionary rule which does not operate to exclude evidence 
unless it fits an exception; but rather allows admission of 
relevant evidence unless offered solely to show the defendant's 
bad character. O'Neil. 848 P.2d at 700. Accord State v. 
Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah 1989). "Thus, Rule 404 
allows prior bad act evidence in a criminal trial where it is 
offered to show any element of the alleged crime." O'Neil, 848 
P.2d at 700. See also Featherson, 781 P.2d at 426 ("[w]hen 
[other acts] evidence may establish constitutive elements of the 
crime . . . it is admissible even though it tends to prove that 
the defendant has committed other crimes"). Further, rule 404(b) 
specifically recognizes knowledge, intent and identity as matters 
properly addressed by other acts evidence. Moreover, as further 
recognized by this Court, knowledge and intent are fl [e] ssential 
elements" of the drug-related crimes for which defendant was 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
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convicted. O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 700. See also State v. Olsen, 
869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994) (Olsen's prior bad acts 
admissible to disprove his defense that he lacked intent to 
murder victim); State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 295 (Utah App. 
1990) (where Morrell's intent was contested issue, State could 
discredit his theory of events with prior crimes evidence); State 
v. Tavlor, 818 P.2d 561, 569-70 (Utah App. 1991) (citing with 
approval federal cases in which evidence of prior drug related 
crimes was permitted to establish knowledge and intent in 
narcotics prosecutions). 
In short, defendant's prior drug related conviction was 
probative of matters other than his criminal propensity; 
specifically, it helped to refute his claims of ignorance and 
lack of intent and to establish that he, not his mother, sold the 
methamphetamine to Hafen. Accordingly, the trial court did not 
exceed its discretion by admitting the evidence.8 
8
 Even applying the bifurcated standard of review set 
forth in O'Neil, the record supports the correctness of the trial 
court's admissibility ruling. Indeed, as previously noted in 
Part D, supra, defendant has only nominally challenged the 
admissibility of his prior conviction under rule 404(b) on appeal 
and has made no effort to challenge the court's implicit, 
subsidiary factual determinations. See State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 
724, 734 (Utah App.) ("An appellant raising issues of fact on 
appeal must, . . . marshal all the evidence supporting the trial 
court's findings, and then show that evidence to be insufficient" 
and/or clearly erroneous), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1991). 
20 
2. Rule 403 
The trial court's ruling similarly passes muster under 
rule 403,9 requiring that the probative value of prior crimes 
evidence outweigh the potential for unfair prejudice. O'Neil, 
848 P.2d at 701. There are several factors for consideration in 
making a rule 403 determination including: the strength of the 
other crimes evidence, the similarities between the other crimes 
and the charged offense, the temporal proximity between the two, 
the efficacy of alternative proof, or the degree to which the 
other crimes evidence will rouse the jury to over-mastering 
hostility. State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 296 (Utah 1984).10 
Here, defendant's prior felony drug conviction 
constituted strong evidence of his prior drug related activity. 
O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 701 ("A documented conviction is the 
9
 Rule 403 provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
10
 Defendant's rule 403 analysis is inadequate under the 
briefing rule and should be rejected. Utah R. App. Pro. 
24 ()a) (9) (requiring appellant to set forth contentions and 
reasons for claim of error). See Price, 827 P.2d at 249 
(declining to reach merits of appeal due to inadequate legal 
analysis). Defendant merely acknowledges the applicable Shickles 
criteria, wholly failing to engage in legal analysis of the 
probative value of his conviction. Br. of App. at 11-12. 
Rather, defendant makes the singular broad and unsupported claim 
that the admission of his prior conviction "served no purpose 
other than to 'rouse the jury to over mastering hostility.'" Br. 
of App. at 12. 
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strongest possible evidence of a prior crime). The prior 
conviction was also for drug distribution (R. 381, Exh. #12), an 
offense substantively indistinguishable from the charged offenses 
of drug possession and distribution. O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 701 
(finding prior conviction for distribution of small amount of 
controlled substance sufficiently similar to charged distribution 
offense to permit admission). Additionally, defendant's prior 
drug conviction was very close in time to the instant charges, 
having been entered within the previous seven months (R. 3 81). 
O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 701 (holding three year difference between 
prior crime and the incidents leading to the charged crime was 
sufficiently close in time to justify admission). And, while the 
State may have had other evidence of defendant's identity, 
knowledge and intent from its witnesses, defendant's prior 
conviction is not barred on that ground alone. Shickles, 760 
P.2d at 296 (holding prior crime evidence not barred even though 
State had adduced other evidences of Shickle's intent, including 
Shickle's own statements, "particularly because intent [was a] 
hotly contested issue []."). 
Finally, a simple drug distribution charge is not 
likely to rouse a jury to overmastering hostility. O'Neil, 84 8 
P.2d at 701; Taylor, 818 P.2d at 572 ("unlike other more heinous 
or inflammatory types of prior bad act evidence," Taylor's prior 
conviction for marijuana possession was not necessarily likely to 
arouse jury to "overriding hostility"). Nor is there any 
indication that it did so in this case. Indeed, the prior 
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conviction was not emphasized by the court or the prosecutor at 
the time of its admission (R. 352-53), see Addendum B, nor was it 
emphasized by the prosecutor in his closing argument to the jury. 
Rather, the prosecutor stated briefly that the prior conviction 
was an element the jury was required to find and that proof of 
that could be found in Exhibit #12, a certified copy of 
defendant's previous conviction for drug distribution (R. 38 0-
81) . 
Based on the above, the trial court was within its 
discretion to conclude that defendant's prior conviction was at 
least as probative as it was prejudicial. 
E. Admission of Defendant's Prior Conviction 
Does Not Undermine Confidence in the Verdict 
Even assuming this Court finds the record on appeal is 
inadequate to support the trial court's admission of defendant's 
prior conviction under rules 403 and 404(b), admission of the 
evidence does not undermine confidence in the verdict. "The 
standard for reversal in cases involving an erroneous failure to 
exclude prior convictions is whether absent the error, there was 
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
defendant." State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah 1989); State 
v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19, 23 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied, 878 P.2d 
1154 (Utah 1994). See also State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 
(Utah 1992) (recognizing that the "'reasonable likelihood'" 
standard is more concretely articulated as requiring reversal 
only where the error is such that confidence in the verdict is 
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undermined (citing State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 
1987)). 
In determining whether a particular error is harmless, 
the Court considers "'a host of factors, including . . . the 
overall strength of the State's case.'" Olsen, 869 P.2d at 1011 
(quoting Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240). Indeed, "[t]he more 
evidence supporting the verdict, the less likely there was 
harmful error." Id. Here, the State's case against defendant 
was overwhelming. The bulk of the incriminating evidence against 
defendant resulted from a controlled drug transaction which was 
closely monitored by law enforcement. Police informant Garrick 
Hafen arranged a drug buy with defendant over the telephone (R. 
332-34). Hafen recognized defendant's voice, having "been 
around" defendant for approximately six months at the time the 
call was made (R. 334). 
At the time of the subsequent sale, Hafen went to 
defendant's motel room and asked defendant for a one-fourth 
bindle of methamphetamine (R. 339). Defendant replied that he 
had only half bindles "made up" for sale. Id. Because Hafen 
only had $3 0 on him, defendant agreed that Hafen could take a 
half bindle of methamphetamine on Hafen's promise to return with 
an additional $3 0 in the next one-half hour. Id. 
Significantly, both the telephone conversation and the 
actual drug sale were overheard and recorded by investigating 
officers, whose testimony of the same corroborated Hafen's (R. 
207-08, 211, 221, 223-224, 227, 288-91). Moreover, both tape 
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recorded conversations were admitted into evidence and played for 
the jury (R. 342-43, 347; Exh. ##1,4). 
Further, the controlled buy facilitated a search 
warrant for defendant's motel room which police executed 
approximately one hour after the buy (R. 230). At that time, 
police discovered defendant alone in the 6' by 12' motel room 
surrounded, in open and obvious view, by methamphetamine bindles 
and other drug paraphernalia (R. 231-33, 236, 242, 298-99, 302). 
Additionally, police also recovered the $20 bill Hafen had given 
defendant in exchange for the methamphetamine (R. 218; Exh. #9). 
Finally, defendant attempted to explain the tape 
recorded drug transaction with Hafen by conceding that he had in 
fact sold drugs to Hafen in the past, but disputing that he had 
done so on the date charged (R. 372-73). Significantly, 
defendant's concession does not amount to forced damage control 
in response to the admission of his prior conviction; rather, it 
is merely his explanation for the independently incriminating 
recording. 
The above compelling evidence abundantly supports the 
trial outcome. There is not a reasonable likelihood of a 
different result absent the introduction of defendant's prior 
conviction, nor is confidence in the jury verdict undermined.11 
11
 Both in the trial court and on appeal, defendant has 
only nominally asserted that the alleged erroneous admission of 
his prior conviction amounted to a denial of federal due process 
(R. 194). Br. of App. at 12. He has at no time articulated a 
state constitutional claim. It is therefore unnecessary for the 
Court to consider whether the alleged error was harmless for 
purposes of either the state or federal constitutions. State v. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should find that 
defendant's prior conviction was properly admitted during the 
guilt phase of trial as relevant and probative of his knowledge, 
intent and identity under rules 4 03 and 4 04(b). However, even 
assuming the record is inadequate to support the trial court's 
admissibility ruling, any error in the admission of defendant's 
prior conviction is harmless in light of the overwhelming 
evidence of his guilt. This Court should therefore affirm 
defendant's enhanced first degree felony convictions for drug 
distribution and possession. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J__[_ daY of January, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Webb, 779 P.2d 1108, 1111 n.4 (Utah 1989); State v. Bobo, 803 
P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1990). Even assuming the Court 
determines that the alleged error in this case amounts to a 
denial of due process, the overwhelming weight of the evidence 
against defendant renders the alleged error harmless "beyond any 
doubt." Bishop, 753 P.2d at 498 (noting that it is yet to be 
determined "whether the harmless error standard applicable to 
violations of the state constitution is the erosion of confidence 
standard or the stricter federal 'harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt' standard." (citation omitted)). 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
53 
proceedings. It's a public courtroom, open at all times. 
But if you want to leave, I'm going to excuse you now and 
again thank you for being willing to come here. 
Now, for those of you seated in the jury box, 
and who have been selected to serve as a jury in this case, 
I have one last oath to give you. Would you please all 
stand, face the clerk and raise your right hand and take 
the oath to well and truly try the issues in this case. 
(Whereupon, the jury was duly impanelled and 
sworn to try the cause.) 
THE COURT: Thank you. And please be seated. 
Now, I'm going to give you a few instructions 
very quickly about the case, and then we'll take a recess 
so you can make some phone calls and tell people where 
you're going to be at least for the rest of the day. But 
let me also tell you that as soon as we come back into 
session, if you want to spread out more or get more 
comfortable, please take advantage of that. I only ask 
that you kind of stay in the same spot that — or at least 
in the same order that you are so I can make sure that 
we're not missing anybody when I take a quick look at the 
jury box. 
I'm going to now read some instructions I find 
are helpful to give you at the outset of the case. 
(Whereupon, Instructions 1 through 4 were read.) 
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MR. TERRY: May counsel approach? 
THE COURT: Certainly, Counsel. 
(Whereupon, a discussion was had among Court 
and counsel at the bench out of the hearing of 
the jury, which was not recorded.) 
THE COURT: May the record reflect that 
Mr. Terry, in behalf of the defendant, has approached the 
Court in order to secure a record on a specific objection 
that he wants to bring to the Court's attention. And we'll 
do that at the first recess where we release the jury. 
You may read the Information. 
(Whereupon, the clerk of the court read the 
Information.) 
THE COURT: Thank you. Instruction No. 5, 
"Evidence and Stipulations." 
(Whereupon, Instructions 5 and 6 were read.) 
THE COURT: Now, at this point, members of the 
jury, I'm going to take a recess until 10:30. Counsel and 
I have some things that we need to put on the record in 
your absence, and also I want to give you that chance to 
get up and stand a bit, walk around, make any phone calls 
you need to make. We'll come back into session at 10:30. 
But remember that admonition that I gave you earlier. 
You are instructed or admonished that during 
this recess or any future break in the trial, you're not to 
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discuss the case with anyone or among yourselves nor to 
form or express any opinion as to the innocence or guilt of 
the defendant until the matter is submitted to you. And 
we'll come back into session at 10:30. 
(Whereupon, a discussion was had among Court 
and counsel in open court out of the hearing of 
the jury, which was recorded as follows:) 
THE COURT: And the record will reflect that the 
jury has departed, and the door is closed. 
Mr. Terry, the record should also reflect that I 
gave you an opportunity at the bench prior to the taking of 
peremptory challenges to give to the Court a challenge as 
to leaving on the jury Mr. Woods, who was a — a 
prospective juror. The record should show that the defense 
used their first peremptory challenge to strike Mr. Woods. 
It is also the position, if I'm not mistaken, 
Mr. Terry, that because of the business relationship where 
Mr. Seegmiller, one of the State's witnesses, serves in a 
part-time capacity as a driveway cleaner or a parking lot 
cleaner for Mr. Woods' business, that you had a challenge 
for cause on that basis. 
Am I accurate? 
MR. TERRY: That's correct, Your Honor. 
Mr. Seegmiller is an industrious young man and has 
businesses interests in addition to his calling as a police 
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1 officer. And as I stated at the bench, I was aware that 
2 there was some other business relationship, although I'd 
3 forgotten exactly what it was. And I think that based on 
4 the close proximity in time to this trial of the last 
5 business that the two transacted together, that required my 
6 challenge for cause. 
7 THE COURT: All right. And your record is 
8 made. 
9 The State opposed that challenge. Is that 
10 accurate, Mr. Ludlow? 
11 MR. LUDLOW: That's correct, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: All right. And the Court ruled 
13 against your challenge for cause at that time, and now the 
14 record is made. 
15 Mr. Terry, you also, immediately prior to the 
16 clerk's reading of the Information this morning, wanted to 
17 place a motion in limine before the Court to have the Court 
18 make no reference to or any items on the record with 
19 respect to Mr. Piccirillo's prior convictions as set forth, 
20 in Counts I and II as charged in the Amended Information. 
21 Let me give you this opportunity to complete that record 
22 now in the absence of the jury. 
23 MR. TERRY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
24 Yes. My motion would be in the form of a motion 
25 in limine and motion to bifurcate at least with respect to 
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1 any evidence that might be presented with — as far as 
2 prior convictions of Mr. Piccirillo. That is made on the 
3 grounds of Rules of Evidence 403, wherein it allows for 
4 evidence that might otherwise be relevant to be excluded if 
5 its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. And 
6 clearly this is an element of the offense. It has great 
7 probative value. It's key, obviously, to the degree of the 
8 offense as charged. But I think that under Rule 403 and in 
9 order to afford my client due process of law and a fair 
10 trial in this matter, it should be bifurcated. The jury 
11 should hear evidence with respect to the particular 
12 transaction that forms the basis of the body of both 
13 counts, and then if they make a finding against my client 
14 with respect to that, then they would make a finding as to 
15 whether or not — and, frankly, it could be either the 
16 Court or the jury. We would have no objection to the 
17 Court, as a finder of fact, making a finding with respect 
18 to the prior conviction. But I feel like that that should 
19 not be made — that that evidence should not be a part 
20 of — of the trial on the other issues — the other 
21 elements in those two counts. 
22 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Counsel. 
23 This is going to be the Court's ruling on that 
24 particular issue. With respect to the reading of the 
25 Information, I see no prejudice having been brought forth 
PAULG.MCMULLIN 
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1 with the jury having heard the allegations in the 
2 Information. They have been repeatedly instructed that 
3 those are merely allegations. 
4 With respect to the process of the trial, 
5 Mr. Ludlow, I am going to order that with the presenting of 
6 the evidence, that the very last thing that the State may 
7 put in before it rests — and make no reference to it until 
8 such prior time — is the prior conviction upon which the 
9 enhancement of both Count I and II are based. That will 
10 allow the Court the opportunity to specifically make the 
11 decision as to whether or not that evidence should come in, 
12 weighing all of the State's evidence in light of Rule 403 
13 of the Rules of Evidence, prejudicial value versus 
14 probative effect, and Rule 404(b) of the Rules of Evidence, 
15 evidence admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
16 motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
17 identity or absence of mistake or accident, until the case 
18 is — the State's case in chief is shown to me in its 
19 entirety. Absent that matter, I will not have a 
20 satisfactory evidentiary basis in order to conduct the 
21 weighing process that the Rules of Evidence require that I 
22 engage in before admitting the evidence. 
23 Any problem with that ruling, Mr. Ludlow? 
24 MR. LUDLOW: No, Your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: All right. That's the record. 
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lie under oath? You know what those consequences would be? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you've told the truth? 
A. I have. Yes, I have. 
MR. LUDLOW: I have nothing further. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Terry? 
MR. TERRY: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Hafen. 
You may step down. 
May this witness be excused? 
MR. LUDLOW: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hafen, you may 
leave, or you can sit here in the courtroom if you want 
to. But you may leave if you wish. 
MR. LUDLOW: Your Honor, may counsel approach 
the bench? 
THE COURT: Certainly, Counsel. 
(Whereupon, a discussion was had among Court 
and counsel at the bench out of the hearing of 
the jury, which was not recorded.) 
THE COURT: Mr. Ludlow, you offer State's 
Exhibit No. 12, which is a certified copy of the Judgment, 
Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation 
and Commitment in the case of State of Utah, plaintiff, 
versus Kelly James Piccirillo, Washington County Case 
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No. 931500375? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
Is that your offer? 
LUDLOW: 
COURT: 
TERRY: 
the same grounds that : 
made my Motion 
overruled. 
Counsel? 
identified 
Honor? 
THE 
It is, Your Honor. 
Your response, Mr. Terry? 
Your Honor, I renew my objection on 
E put on the record at the time I 
in Limine, a motion to bifurcate. 
COURT: 
Exhibit No 
You 
MR. 
THE 
do not < 
LUDLOW: 
COURT: 
or offered. 
All right. Your objection was 
. 12 is received. 
Dffer 13 or 15; is that correct, 
That's correct, Your Honor. 
13 and 15 are not marked or 
Anything else, Mr. Ludlow? 
MR. 
THE 
LUDLOW: 
COURT: 
(Discussion 
MR. 
THE 
LUDLOW: 
COURT: 
(Whereupon, 
and 
the 
MR. 
THE 
counsel 
Could I have just a minute, Your 
Certainly, Counsel. 
off the record.) 
May counsel approach? 
Certainly. 
a discussion was had among Court 
at the bench out of the hearing of 
jury, which was not recorded.) 
LUDLOW: 
COURT: 
Your Honor, the State would rest. 
All right. The State having rested, 
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